Egregious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) are being committed every day both by states and non-state parties to a battle. This does not, however, mean that all contemporary armed conflicts are always and inexorably characterized by sweeping and widespread violations. Nevertheless, the disregard of IHL causes devastation and appalling suffering for the victims. What makes such violations even more reprehensible is that the sufferings could be avoided had the pertinent IHL rules were respected. Hence, initiatives should focus on enhancing the efficacy of IHL compliance mechanisms to ensure the lofty aim of IHL, minimizing human suffering and protecting victims. In this essay, a scrutiny on the adequacy of current IHL compliance system in light of contemporary armed conflict is made and a conclusion as to the existence of loopholes has been reached.
Introduction
It is axiomatic that the overriding objective of IHL is to lighten the suffering of persons affected by war regardless of the underlying causes or the justification of the conflict by defending those not or no longer taking part in a conflict and by regulating the means and methods of combat. In contemporary armed conflicts, however, protected persons are indebted to pay high price including death, injury Beijing Law Review and lasting disability as well as widespread annihilation of their homes, livelihoods and infrastructure. All this materializes as the ICRC said in multifarious fora, not because of the lack of rules but rather the widespread blatant violations of those that already exist. This could be attributable to lack of satisfactory enforcement mechanisms or knowledge of IHL or both (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2013: p. 55 ).
Finding ways and means to ensure greater respect for IHL is, thus, one of the most demanding humanitarian challenges. Recent developments in Mali, Nigeria, Cameron Chad, the Arab Spring uprisings, the persisting civil war in Syria and the endless crisis in Afghanistan are also constant reminders of the need to focus on strengthening compliance system of IHL (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2013: p. 9) . This is because the grand aim of IHL, minimizing human suffering and protecting person affected by violence, could not be achieved by the mere existence of the law rather it must be coupled with strong compliance system. This essay has the aim of exploring and discovering the situation in contemporary armed conflict in tandem with the rules of war, the inadequacy of current IHL compliance system and the possible recommendation to strengthen compliance mechanism to minimize horrible effect of war. In general, it addresses the following major issues: the degree of respect for IHL in contemporary armed conflict is examined, an evaluation as to the adequacy of the existing compliance system of IHL in ensuring respect for the rule of war is made, and the ways to strengthening the compliance system of IHL are recommended. These include, among other, forwarding means for revitalization of the existing system and adoption of additional mechanisms. Finally, the essay contains conclusion.
Overview of Contemporary Armed Conflicts
Nowadays, armed conflicts are taking place in almost all regions of the world, the majority being non-international (NIAC) (ICRC, 2008, p. 5) . The behaviors observed therein are increasingly defying the very notion of humanity. For example, by the year 2014 alone, 40 armed conflicts were active in 27 places worldwide, which is the highest number of conflicts reported since 1999 (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015: p. 537) 1 .
In the face of their prohibition, we are witnessing to sustained daily transgressions of IHL, including thoughtful attacks against civilians, the destruction of infrastructure vital to the civilian population, the forcible displacement of entire communities from their habitual places and various forms of sexual violence inflicted against vulnerable individuals and groups (ICRC, 2007: p. 720 In addition, attacks by using explosive weapons towards populated areas like towns, market centers, ritual places and schools are rampant. Due to this, the civilians in Syria, Gaza, Libya, Iraq, Eastern Ukraine, Somalia, Nigeria, and many more have experienced, and continue to experience, the horrible effect of explosive weapons (Belete, 2015: p. 3).
These substandard respects for the rules have been a constant-and unfortunate result of the lack of political will and practical ability of states and armed groups engaged in armed conflicts to abide by their legal obligations (ICRC, 2003: p. 20) . In many situations, this is linked to a repudiation of the applicability or relevance of IHL. The fact that armed groups usually enjoy no immunity from domestic criminal prosecution for mere partaking in hostilities (even if they respect IHL) remains an important disincentive in practice for better IHL compliance by such groups (ICRC, 2003: p. 23 ). The strategy employed by non-state actors in asymmetric warfare, including terrorism, also constitutes a big challenge for IHL.
Though the existing rule is sufficient to protect civilians and civilian objects from the act of terror committed in armed conflict, such assault remains common (ICRC, 2007: p. 723) . From the non-state actors point of view, the targeting of civilians and civilian objects is often seen as a necessary mean to obtain a certain goal, which means there is a deliberate non-compliance of IHL.
It remains the case that some states appear increasingly reluctant to admit that they have become parties to an armed conflict even if facts on the ground prove otherwise, and, therefore, deny that IHL applies to their actions.
Thus, the entire horrific situation is a deep alarm to the ICRC and other stakeholders to work on strengthening compliance system of IHL thereby exerting the effort to minimizing human suffering.
Adequacy of the Existing IHL Compliance Mechanisms
Over the years, states, supported by other actors, have devoted a substantial effort IHL treaties establish three main compliance mechanisms applicable during armed conflicts: Protecting Powers, the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, and a formal enquiry procedure. Common article 8 of the Geneva Conventions introduced the system of appointing Protecting Power. It is a neutral state authorized by a warring state to defend its welfares and those of its nationals' vis-a'-vis an adversary state. It has two major roles. In one hand, it can conduct relief and protection operations to the victims. On the other hand, it supervises the belligerents' compliance with their legal undertakings. However, if protecting powers are not appointed by any means, common article 10 of the Geneva Conventions provide for the ICRC to take the place of the Protecting Power, and make provision for the ICRC to visit prisoners of war and detained civilians. Article 5 of Protocol I, which gives the ICRC a new role, lets it to tender its good offices to the Parties to the battle. Be that as it may, the role of Protecting Powers has been ever more neglected. It has been appointed in only five IACs since the adoption of the 1949 GCs. Further, Article 90 of Additional Protocol I announced the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission with the role of inquiring into any accusations of serious violations of the Geneva Conventions or API. It is also competent to facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and the Protocol. The international community thought that the doings of the Commission should help to prevent polemics and violence from escalating during a conflict. However, to date the Commission has not been used, despite more than 70 States having made a general declaration accepting the competence of the IHFFC. An enquiry procedure is provided for under the Geneva Conventions, but to date has not worked at all since its inception. It intended to resolve dispute between state parties to an IAC regarding alleged violations. However, any attempt to establish enquiry procedures have failed in the past. Its ultimate reliance on the belligerents' consent is undoubtedly one of the reasons for its failure. Fourthly, most of existing IHL mechanisms relies on the sole initiative or acceptance of the parties to a conflict to act. Fifthly, implementation of the protecting power mechanism is most likely cumbersome since the three states concerned must come to an agreement on the principle, which is difficult when two of them are at war. Six, while it is today uncontroversial that armed groups, like state, are internationally responsible for violations of IHL, the exact rules on attribution, content and implementation of such responsibility are not yet clarified (Sassoli, 2010: p. 44 ).
All in all, the inadequacy of existing IHL compliance mechanisms is not doubtful. They merely rely on the will of the par-ties to a conflict to act. They also lack attachment to a broader institutional compliance structure. To the worst, none of the existing IHL supervision mechanisms, apart from ICRC, is expressly authorized to address situations of NIAC. They are provided for in treaties that were crafted to regulate IAC though NIAC now constitutes the great majority.
The Way Forwarded
The challenges to the effective implementation of IHL self-evidently exist (In- 
Dissemination
States have a duty, in peace and during armed conflicts, to take certain legal and practical measure, in good faith 
Revitalization of Existing Mechanisms
As part of strengthening the system, focus on the improvement of existing me- (Sassoli, 2010: p. 41) .  Rewarding respect of the law is another means that would increase their sense of ownership.
a) The home state should provide immunity for mere participation in hostilities by whatsoever means, including amnesties 9 , because it is difficult to motivate members of an armed group to comply with IHL if their treatment by the government will not be affected by such compliance. b) Foreign states could reward members of armed groups fighting abroad while respecting IHL by considering prosecution for mere participation in hostilities as persecution leading to eligibility as a refugee, while denying refugee status to members of armed groups who violated IHL (Sassoli, 2010: p. 24 ). Similarly, they could apply the exemption from extradition for political offenders in extradition treaties to members of armed groups involved in an armed conflict, except for acts contrary to IHL (Sassoli, 2010: p. 24 ). 
New Mechanism to Strengthening IHL Compliance System
Although there might be a fear that the general international atmosphere at present is not conducive to the establishment of new mechanisms, I view for gradual adoption of them. As discussed earlier, the insufficiency of respect for IHL, among others, is attributable to the defects of existing system. And therefore, to effectively rectify such gaps any new mechanism should have, to the minimum, the following features:
First, there should be a forum where states can meet and discuss to evaluate when their obligation to ensure respect under common Article 1 is triggered, and to coordinate their response in case of insufficient respect (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2013: p. 116) . Because the determination of whether violations are being committed, and whether such violations are sufficiently serious to require action on their part is difficult.
Second, there should be an independent body with the capacity to trigger itself and to provide States with the necessary information to assess whether the law was respected or violated (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2013: p. 16 ). It is necessary to create a distinct expert body to draft a periodic and public report on the compliance of IHL throughout the world, including by armed groups. Such a body should, however, be organized in the way to avoid an automatic State-centric bias of such a body. Because of its normally confidential, 13 See e.g. SC Res. 1193 Res. (1998 concerning Afghanistan, 764 (1992 Afghanistan, 764 ( ), 771 (1992 Afghanistan, 764 ( ), 780 (1992 Afghanistan, 764 ( ), 787 (1992 Afghanistan, 764 ( ), 941 (1994 Afghanistan, 764 ( ), and 1010 Afghanistan, 764 ( (1995 concerning the former Yugoslavia. field-work-oriented approach, the ICRC might not be the ideal body to undertake this task (Zegveld, 2002: p. 162) .
Third, such mechanism must have the authorization to deal with armed groups-which necessarily means giving them the possibility to voice their positions, problems and aspirations with someone in such a mechanism. This will be the greatest challenge, but a necessary step towards greater respect for international humanitarian law (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2013: p.
116).
Fourth, the mechanism in questions should take costs and administrative burdens into account.
Fifth, legal recourses that the international community can take to sanction transgressions should be re-considered to effectively address violation by armed groups.
To illustrate, the new IHL compliance system will have the following functions:  Regular meetings of States: This will serve as a core for the new IHL compliance system.  Fact-finding: a method of ascertaining controversial facts, based on information gathered, compiled and analyzed from a range of sources.  Periodic reporting can serve to create political will because state wants to avoid the embarrassment either to be obliged to report violations or to be subject to questions by the monitoring body (International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2004: p. 57) .  Needless to say, the new mechanism should have multifaceted functions. This may include: dispute settlement, early warning, urgent appeals, country visit, non-binding legal opinion and regular thematic discussions on IHL issues.
There might be many that should be incorporated but the above list is mere attempt to list a few of important.
Conclusion
IHL is ceaselessly challenged by the evolution of contemporary armed conflict.
This results enormous human suffering. Badly, this repercussion being caught amid hostilities would be far lesser if IHL were properly implemented by the parties to conflicts. These question the adequacy of the existing compliance system of IHL. Even though the regime has its own independent compliance systems, they are found defective and insufficient because they are of limited scope, crafted for international armed conflict only, and rarely, if ever, been used, and, therefore, the agenda of minimizing human suffering and protecting person affected by violence calls for strengthening compliance system of IHL.
Limitations
The chief approach employed in this manuscript is desktop research. It investigated only some of the general key problems regarding IHL compliance system 
